Adds the 6-digit customer PIN that approves every action moving EnakPoint or EnakCoin on the customer's request (docs/prd-point-coin.md K8, F11, Q16, Q17, PC-301). Migration 000093 adds the PIN columns to customers and the customer_security_events table. PIN data is read and written only through CustomerPinRepository, never the Customer entity, so the hash cannot reach a customer response. Only a bcrypt hash is stored. - /customer/pin: status, OTP (pin_setup, pin_reset), create, change, reset. The OTP must be for that purpose and sent to the customer's own number; the existing OTP validation checks neither. A new PIN is checked (6 digits, confirmed, not one digit, not a run up or down, not the birth date as DDMMYY or YYMMDD) before the OTP is spent. - Five wrong attempts in a row lock the PIN for 30 minutes; the counter is incremented in one statement so attempts at the same time all count, and a lock that ran out starts a new series. A locked PIN is refused even when right. The customer is told by WhatsApp, as there is no push channel to customers yet; only the attempt that reached the limit alerts. - A reset through OTP lifts the lock and holds outgoing transfers for 24 hours; paying and exchanging still work, and a held transfer costs no attempt. - VerifyPin(ctx, customer, pin, action) for the flows that follow, with PIN_NOT_SET, PIN_INVALID (attempts left), PIN_LOCKED and TRANSFER_BLOCKED (until when), which PinErrorResponse turns into distinct codes and statuses. - DELETE /marketing/customers/:id/pin (loyalty managers, reason required) and GET /marketing/customers/:id/security-events, scoped to the organization. Every PIN event is in the security log with IP and user agent. No message or binding error contains a PIN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
51 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"apskel-pos-be/internal/processor"
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"apskel-pos-be/internal/repository"
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"apskel-pos-be/internal/util"
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)
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func TestPinErrorResponse(t *testing.T) {
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until := time.Date(2026, 9, 30, 12, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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for name, c := range map[string]struct {
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err error
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code string
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status int
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data map[string]interface{}
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}{
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"not set": {&processor.PinError{Code: processor.PinErrNotSet}, "PIN_NOT_SET", http.StatusForbidden, map[string]interface{}{"code": "PIN_NOT_SET"}},
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"invalid": {fmt.Errorf("pay: %w", &processor.PinError{Code: processor.PinErrInvalid, RemainingAttempts: 2}), "PIN_INVALID", http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]interface{}{"code": "PIN_INVALID", "remaining_attempts": 2}},
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"locked": {&processor.PinError{Code: processor.PinErrLocked, Until: &until}, "PIN_LOCKED", http.StatusLocked, map[string]interface{}{"code": "PIN_LOCKED", "locked_until": &until}},
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"transfer": {&processor.PinError{Code: processor.PinErrTransferBlocked, Until: &until}, "TRANSFER_BLOCKED", http.StatusForbidden, map[string]interface{}{"code": "TRANSFER_BLOCKED", "transfer_blocked_until": &until}},
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} {
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resp := PinErrorResponse(c.err)
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assert.False(t, resp.Success, name)
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assert.Equal(t, c.code, resp.Errors[0].Code, name)
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assert.Equal(t, c.status, util.MapErrorCodeToHttpStatus(resp.Errors[0].Code), name)
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assert.Equal(t, c.data, resp.Data, name)
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}
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for name, c := range map[string]struct {
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err error
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status int
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}{
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"weak PIN": {fmt.Errorf("%w: too easy", processor.ErrInvalidPinInput), http.StatusBadRequest},
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"bad OTP": {processor.ErrPinOtpInvalid, http.StatusBadRequest},
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"already set": {processor.ErrPinAlreadySet, http.StatusBadRequest},
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"too soon": {processor.ErrPinOtpTooSoon, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
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"no customer": {repository.ErrPinCustomerNotFound, http.StatusNotFound},
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"anything else": {fmt.Errorf("db down"), http.StatusInternalServerError},
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} {
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resp := PinErrorResponse(c.err)
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assert.Equal(t, c.status, util.MapErrorCodeToHttpStatus(resp.Errors[0].Code), name)
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}
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}
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